BOKO HARAM: 1,042 NIGERIANS FLEE TO DIFFA PREFECTURE IN NIGER – UN ; NIGER REINFORCE SECURITY ALONG THE BORDER WITH NIGERIA

Boko Haram militants, screenshot from a 2010 video

Boko Haram militants, screenshot from a 2010 video

06/12/2012
NIAMEY (AFP)

More than 1,000 Nigerians have fled to
neighbouring Niger after six people were killed in an attack on their village blamed on Islamist group Boko Haram, the United Nations said Thursday.

The 1,042 refugees crossed the northern
border into the Niger region of Diffa after the November 30 attack, and have been taken in by families in two villages near the regional capital, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said in a bulletin. A teacher in the village confirmed the
attack to local media.

He said the attackers told villagers they were looking for “politicians” and “coldly killed” six people, including a police officer, after the victims were unable to recite verses of the Koran.

A security source said Niger’s army has
deployed reinforcements along its border with Nigeria, a focus of worry for
Nigerien authorities who have often
assured they are taking measures to stop Boko Haram’s activities from spilling over into Niger.

Violence linked to the Boko Haram
insurgency in Nigeria — a country roughly divided between a mainly Muslim north and a predominantly Christian south — is believed to have left some 3,000 people dead there since 2009, including killings by the security forces.

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About beegeagle

BEEG EAGLE -perspectives of an opinionated Nigerian male with a keen interest in Geopolitics, Defence and Strategic Studies
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19 Responses to BOKO HARAM: 1,042 NIGERIANS FLEE TO DIFFA PREFECTURE IN NIGER – UN ; NIGER REINFORCE SECURITY ALONG THE BORDER WITH NIGERIA

  1. peccavi says:

    A predictable but not positive development.
    As the major population centres become better defended and targets dry up either bcause they are better defended, have run away or BH no longer has the capability they will begin to focus of small scale, low tech, easy to execute attacks like this.
    This gives them a relevance and also creates an ungoverned space in which they can thrive.
    The next development (if its not already happening will be the formation of a shadow government with Sharia courts and taxes on the locals. Again I’m relatively sure this is already happening.
    The Federal Government is now faced with the classic COIN dilemma, how to protect the entire population all the time.
    This is exactly the problem in Afghanistan (please note, I said the problem was an inability to protect the entire population not a shortage of MRAPs!!)

    There is insufficient combat power to combat this threat.

    There are 4 possible options
    1) Special Forces Action: the insertion of dedicated special forces teams who will a) advise local police and villagers on defence and security and operate manily at night ambushing insurgents, following and tracking them and interdicting their supply lines. This is the clinical solution however I doubt Nigeria has sufficient SF to do this and I’m not sure they have derived the requisite skill set just yet. They will also need to operate across the border which is tricky legally and might lead to issues.
    2) Garrison the area: flood the area with troops and/ or police, with permanent check points on all navigable routes, garrisons in all population centres, patrols by foot, vehicle and air, in and around the Area of operations and seal the border. The question is whether Nigeria has sufficient combat power to do this at present? Poorly trained and incompetent personnel are worse than no personnel at all as they inevitably run away surrendering their weapons and equipment and behave so badly they push locals towards the insurgents. It is important that this is undertaken by competent, well led troops. Do we have the combat power? I’m struggling to say yes.
    3) Arm the villagers give them rudimentary self defence lessons and communications equipment. This is a bad idea on all fronts as you simply increase the number of weapons in circulation to people who might later turn those weapons on the state or each other or to crime.

    4) Identify the most defensible locations, construct defensible villages and evacuate the affected villagers to this place. This is bad on so many levels, because you are taking people away from their homes and livelihoods, conceding ground to the enemy and admitting you cant defeat them. And its expensive and just as time consuming. It is good though as it creates a free fire area in which to engage the insurgents with heavy weapons and denies them cover from civilians

    The best option is special forces option, the most likely option is garrison. I would strongly suggest the FGN looks to raising an auxiliary police force, specifically trained for COIN ops, heavily armed and equipped as per a light or mechanised infantry sub unit. When the crisis is over they can be absorbed into the regular police or kept as a formed unit to react to crisis.
    It should take about 6-9 months to raise, train and equip such a unit but otherwise we will keep deploying our military denude our strength and still not achieve victory.
    The dynamics in Mali will change the game. The main protagonists are criminal entrepreneurs more than ideological terrorists and they will soon make a deal, this will push out alot of the hardcore fundamentalists and although Niger will give them enough space for safe haven, Nigeria will give them the environment in which to continue the jihad.

    As I’ve said before things will get worse before they get better but this i a decision point for the FGN as to how they see this conflict playing out and as to how they can influence the outcome in their given time frame

    • jimmy says:

      The first option is the best option . Even in afghanistan , America, Britain and Ibelieve you went through it yourself garrisons rural outposts is a made -for- t.v. -special- come -and- attack -us- at night.
      I don’t want to sound cold or overly optimistic but you cannot even with the greatest amount of unlimited resources defend every inch of your space, then what is the solution?
      Insertion of special forces with a slightly different mandate, th price that boko haram pays must become very high each time they attack/ harass a rural outposts it is not just pursuing them to the border but going over the border( with permission from Niger who has no love for them) . The message has to be backed up by what we have been shouting / advocating better accountability, better infrastructure, better trained personnel
      Giving weapons to ill equipped villagers is like giving / creating a supply chain for boko haram , it really did not work to stop the killing in algeria , pakistain, india, afghanistan.
      What will work is better infiltration, better training , better infrastructure, better coin operations, in short oga peccavi ,this is the British model for what they did to the ira in the late eighties very early 90s with devastating effectiveness using the SAS IN PLACES LIKE LONDONDERRY.

      • peccavi says:

        Yes I agree but Northern Ireland is not Northern Nigeria. It is an island with one land border, with governed spaces on both sides. North east Nigeria has 2 land borders, is under populated and a harsh undeveloped terrain.

        Without knowing the size of a designate AO even if you deploy the SF in battalion strength, each sub unit needs to be strong enough to simultaneously defend itself, defend its AO, conduct patrols and ambushes, and conduct training. This calls for a minimum of platoon strength at any location.

        Bearing in mind troops will be injured, need R&R, attend courses retraining etc there will not be enough troops to go around. Training up to SF standard should properly take 1-2 years at the least and even then you are inexperienced. SO in other words if we deploy all our SF it will be 2 years before a new crop comes in at the same time SF needs to carry out its current duties and train the next batch. In essence its unsustainable.

        An alternative would be using the Para battalions working on the principle that like in western and eastern models they are tougher, better trained, better orientated and better disciplined.
        However they are still conventional army units and would still need to be rotated every year or 6 months. A proper COIN infrastructure as you’ve put out there is what is needed but the strategic planning needs to take place right now and the moves put in place.
        All these ad hoc joint forces deny reality. Insurgency and terrorism have come to stay. You think after 2015 some mischievous Igbo politicians will not say ‘It was their turn’ and start their own? Or some Oduduwa sentimentalists wont resurrect the spectre of the Oyo Empire and start their own. This is why a dedicated COIN force is needed that can not only fight fire with fire using flexible techniques and tactics but also put in place soft power. So a deployed force in the North East that also provides primary healthcare and holds seed banks and micro finance institutes or Agric advisor will easily swing people from BH to the FGN

  2. beegeagle says:

    Northeast Nigeria, covering an area of 265,000 sq.km is spatially larger than all of the United Kingdom or Uganda or Ghana.

    From the region of the 1,600m high Kunatata Hills of Taraba State near Bissaula on the border with anglophone NW Cameroon and on to the region of Nguru near the border with Niger Republic, it boasts land and maritime frontiers which are about 1,500km long from SE to NW around the Nguru-Hadejia wetlands.

    The NE region is ringed to the north by the oases and sand dunes of the fast-advancing Sahara – on the Niger border and to the east, it is totally straddled by highlands and mountain systems – Mandara, Shebshi, Gotel, Alantika, Adamawa and Mandara ranges. The largest of these highland systems, the Mambilla(1830-2419m above sea level) covers an area equal in size to the Gambia.

    Northeast Nigeria shares frontiers with three countries – Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Many of its six states are comparable in size to some African countries

    - Yobe and Taraba states are comparable is size to Togo

    - Borno state is roughly equal in size to Sierra Leone

    - Bauchi State is larger than Guinea Bissau

    - Adamawa State is one-and-one-half times larger than Equatorial Guinea.

    My work in logistics these past six years and my travels around the country also make it clear that the presence and power of the State weakens remarkably as you move towards the distant borders of the Far Northeast. This fact and the reality of terrorists apparently using rear bases in Chad, Cameroon and Niger accounts for the attacks on Baga, Gamboru-Ngala, Banki, Mubi, Damasak, Kukawa etc. Indeed, towns on the orther side of the border such as Fotokol, Kousseri, Mora, Amchide(all in Cameroon) and Diffa in Niger have all been mentioned in connection with arrests of BH members.

    GPS tracking of trucks undertaken by me and from practical experience, my frightfully precise SHELL Road Distance Chart tell me that a Lagos-Jos-Maiduguri trip stretches for 1,675kms while Abuja-Maiduguri is 885km.

    Further to the east in that same Borno, travel to Gamboru-Ngala, a town situated 140km away from Maiduguri on the Cameroonian border which was attacked last weekend and from LAGOS, you would have travelled 1,815km; from ABUJA 1025km to get to Gamboru-Ngala.

    Coordinating the distribution of materiel intended for GSM base stations in 2008-2010, I found out that places such as Kukawa, Damasak, Baga and Monguno in northern Borno are even farther away from Maiduguri than is Gamboru-Ngala..with a roadtrip between Seme(Lagos)and Bisagana in the northernmost corner of Borno entailing a full 2000 km drive.

    In closing, the peculiar geography and the size of that turbulent region – the most remote in Nigeria – are factors which must be taken into consideration when CTCOIN operations are xrayed because it determines everything – ease of infiltration and escape, skills sets required and the wide dispersal of communities – some nestled in rugged highland terrain, others in desert fringes. Same reason why they tried to establish a foothold in the Mandara Mts..same reason why their first known camp was established at Kanamma, a desert village within a one mile radius of the Niger border. BH have again almost certainly been preying on far-flung villages near the Niger border by crossing porous, desertified frontiers.Special circumstances call for special arrangements. I have had my say.

    By the way, Peccavi, nice precis.

  3. beegeagle says:

    Based on my practical experience of this area, you would recall that I have similarly called for the deployment of detached platoons of soldiers across the length and breadth of Greater Borno(Borno+Yobe states).

    I suggested way back in January, that these guys be specially trained in desert warfare, given enhanced training in mountain warfare and that each platoon be equipped with a scout car, an APC and two .50 calibre HMG-armed 4WD vans, in addition to airconditioned tents such as have been provided elsewhere for troops of the Multinational Joint Task Force which suffices between Cameroon, Chad and Niger. I advised that these guys be resupplied by helicopters. At its broadest end, Greater Borno is a 350 mile front and at its deepest end, it is over 275 miles..stretching from the area around Shani(beyond Biu) to Bisagana near the Niger border.

    We have similarly stated that the aftershocks of insurgency shall remain with us for another decade or more. This is the reality because one mid-level commander today probably fancies himself as a supremo tomorrow and the circumstances are way too ideal – remoteness, harsh environment and the cross-border flow of arms which has sufficed since the 1980s.

    Indeed, Chad have endured the ebb and tide of insurrection and civil war non-stop since 1978. Tuareg rebels have also been active in the northern and empty eastern quarter of Niger for over a decade now. Arms all over.

    Further afield, there is thriving trade and movement of persons into Borno from Central African Republic and Sudan. Borno has been a cultural crossroads and trading hub for centuries with the old Mais of Borno haven controlled the eastern trans-Saharan trade routes leading to the Fezzan in Libya and Kairouan in modern Tunisia, using Turkish mercenaries. The peoples of the Western Sudan(northern West Africa) have also passed through Borno over the centuries as they made their way to Arabia for the Hajj.

    The sudden cascade from Gaddafi’s busted armouries has only served to complicate a heady mix of transnational interactions which are thick with security implications.

    So the Nigerian Army’s ORBAT 2010 specifically details the necessity for a COIN-biased division, a Special Forces brigade and an Army Aviation Wing. That plan appears to be gathering pace now. The NAF have trained 40 army pilots. A new 176 Special Forces Battalion has taken off – to add to 72 Special Forces Bn. Over 8,000 troops have been trained in 4-6 week Basic CTCOIN Proficiency and deployed to gain combat experience while hundreds of officers have undergone 4-6 months Basic Operational Capability Special Warfare courses in 2012 alone – 16 weeks and 8 weeks at the NDA and the NATRAC while 154 officers concluded a four-month crash course at the Infantry Corps Centre last week.

    I want to see JSTF decentralise operations and to see the NA detach platoons and have them fan out across the AOR. In Maiduguri, we not only have the 21 Armoured Brigade Garrison but also an Artillery Regiment. Elsewhere in Borno, we have a minimum of four tank, armoured and artillery battalions and regiments(details withheld).

    This deployment now has to be reconsidered. At the time when it took effect 30 years ago, we envisaged an armoured and artillery onslaught against belligerent conventional forces in Chad and Cameroon.

    I suggest that two of these armoured and artillery formations be replaced with COIN-biased/SF battalions which should be comprised of no less than 25 platoons each. One should be stationed in northern Borno and must be enhanced with added-on skills in desert warfare while the other in southern Borno should be additionally drilled in mountain warfare. This is after all the zone where the extinct volcanic and ubiquitous Kerawa-Gwoza-Burraland-Mandara highlands are to be found.

  4. beegeagle says:

    Peccavi, I would not know how the idea of “special villages” in a Nigeria where people have always lived freely without the muzzling influence of state control getting in the way. We have never been that ID card/pass society and even our military governments were not as harsh as the one-party republics which sufficed around until the end of the Cold War.

    That template was adopted during the Malayan Insurgency but you must recall that British colonialists were in charge at that time and they had little regard for the liberties of any agitated indigenous peoples – ref Malaysia and MauMau in Kenya.

    The same tactics were also used in racist Rhodesia by the Ian Smith regime of yore but that was a minority-ruled and draconian police state where Pass Laws sufficed and apartheid-inspired segregation was a feature of life.

    Given the aforementioned constraints, what would you do differently from “security villages”?? With the contention for land in the face of aridity, it is unlikely that people would move an inch from their land in Borno.

    Just to be sure, sometime during the mid-1990s and at the same time as the Bakassi Conflict of 1993-2008 was underway, 70,000 Nigerians in the Lake Chad region whose portions of the lake had dried up crossed over into Cameroon and established 33 settlements there. The NA repelled an attempt by Cameroon to retake these communities and held onto same until the border delimitation exercise which followed the Green Tree Agreement that settled the Bakassi Dispute. Nigerian troops withdrew from the Bakassi far to the south in the Bakassi Peninsula and in the Lake Chad region.

    So desertification was already an issue in that area of eastern Borno, never mind in the north where you already have oases and sand dunes stacked to the rafters.

    Such folks would rather die on their land than move into any secure villages for fear of being upstaged by rival claimants to land. Not to mention the fact that the State has never wielded such power over the personal lives of Nigerians.

    Imagine what would happen if the FG decided to move the settler Fulani communities from the Jos Plateau today. The sheer blackmail, campaigns of calumny, the protests..you know the rest.

  5. beegeagle says:

    D-E-S says

    Dammnn…@Peccavi I salute you, I
    literally am salivating at your analytical
    prognosis, to me there is everything in
    there to show intricate military-cum-
    political mitigation. It’s solid reasoning
    and it’s something I believe I have witnessed as the understanding of it
    finally starts mutating around Africa…..

    If I may be allowed to use examples I
    intricately understand without risking
    either been referred to as jingoistic or
    upsetting someone else’s national sensibilities…so Kenya again it is loool

    1) I believe we have covered this KSF/
    SOCOM ‘Directorate’ probability before,
    but we are yet to see it beyond assumption….

    2) Garrison the area; There is a common phrase that Kenyan kids in the mid 80’s or so used to use a lot “suguta–ngoto” a corruption of “sugua-ngoto”. I believe my Swahili is really as bad as my Ibo lol…

    But anyway the inference to “suguta/sugua-ngoto” is to strike someone on the back of the head by surprise….yep!! The cruelty of children!!! Anyway cultural rumblings aside; I believe by now we are all aware of the infamous ‘Suguta Valley, Baragoi in Kenya.

    This particular area has been for many years the modern era communal battle-field of cattle rustling, it is also the resting place of many a brave warriors including the 42 who perished not so long ago hence it’s ominous ‘valley of death’ reputation.

    But in the 80’s at the height of the cattle rustling shenanigans the Moi regime in its politically uncompromising but extremely effective internal security policies established a chock-holding permanent base and on the actual valley and created ‘protected-villages’ (option 4@Peccavi) and armed a KPRU (Police
    Reserve Unit…option 3 @Peccavi) This options did not in there entirety deter the act of cattle rustling in those
    communities, what it did was
    marginalise their traditional use of
    Suguta valley and negatively impact
    and politically entrench the nomadic culture of the ‘protected’ and it
    necessitated the progression of an
    ‘offensive tactic’…the ‘lead’ introduction of ASTU (Anti-Stock Theft Unit)

    At this point I believe it’s important to consider the unique topography of Suguta Valley in order to completely understand the emergent tactics from then up to present day…the layout is typically of that of the Rift Valley, vast but much more narrowed from point to point between a high valley within a low valley….Because of its relative altitude and the nature of the valley it presents a very unique conundrum to helicopter based support activities the fear of RPG or heavy weapons fire is real…hence the dismount points are further ranged in/out-field,communication and re-supply is a problem and targeting and support fire coordination is virtually suicidal…

    Suguta Valley is perhaps one of the best natural occurring training facilities in the world…and for the short period that KDF/A was there with their air cavalry ‘lil-birds’ was the baptism of engagement policies and open-field ambush procedures.

    KDF/A has no mandate to overstay their welcome once again, but the
    effectiveness and ineffectiveness of
    their formative deployment has caused
    the pre-emptying out of the problem
    once again, without even a ‘single- shot’ fired in anger, and creating political space to return the rustling communities into strategic political
    dialogue….

    @Peccavi.…[Quote]..” I would strongly suggest the FGN looks to raising an auxiliary police force,specifically trained for COIN ops,heavily armed and equipped as per a light or mechanised infantry sub unit”… [End quote]…

    I would defer that the realistic political solution tactically lies once again in the ASTU mutated, in the formative years of Suguta troubles, they fully adopted to camel patrols, not that they didn’t have the husbandry understanding of it based on other locales, but duplicating the knowledge into a new theatre was a challenge no doubt.

    Until the day socio-economic
    development will surpass the cultural urge to nomadic existence of the
    involved communities in this valley, the
    ASTU should be re-trained, re-
    modernised and equipped to
    accommodate operational support
    from ‘roaming’ units from the likes of KSF/SOCOM, GSU, RDU/BDU and other
    counterpart Civil and military
    intelligence units. I believe that should
    pre-empt any intimated assumptions
    by local politicians designed to break
    established response ‘protocols’…..

    [Quote @Peccavi}…”They will also need
    to operate across the border which is
    tricky legally and might lead to issues”…[End Quote]

    This is the ridding tenant of geopolitical understanding….it is a question of political will, I have with varied posting success tried to further this idea into our understanding,including standing international Law…the right to hot pursuit, yes it does carry ‘diplomatic’ potentials, but not necessarily out-right war!!!

  6. beegeagle says:

    Two and half years ago, I did say something about the necessity for a dedicated border security force, which I should add, one imagined would be a paramilitary outfit – under the Interior Ministry during peacetime and under the Defence Ministry during times of insurgencies and wars

    READ

    http://beegeagle.wordpress.com/2010/04/10/nigeria-needs-a-dedicated-border-security-force/

  7. beegeagle says:

    Concerning protected villages, I am sure you know that

    - it would be resisted by micronationalists and ethnocentrists who have unique intepretations for every military action. Remember what JNI have lately been saying about the redeployment of brasshats from Jaji? In this case, ‘Borno Elders and Leaders of Thought’ would be the first to present a skewed picture to their people and then they shall take the matter before a court of law.

    - Do you recall that earlier this year(July), the STF elsewhere on the Jos Plateau asked people to quit some highland villages preparatory to military action which was aimed at ridding the place of arms and ethnic militiamen? Miyetti Allah, a Fulani pressure group, took the matter before the court of public opinion and resorted to gimmickry steeped in blackmail. Yeah, they were on the BBC expectedly.

    Anyway, the way that they went about it, you would have thought that only the Fulanis were told to leave but in fact, EVERYONE including the natives, were asked to leave the six or so highland villages.

    So I really do not see, given all our known antecedents and proclivities, how Nigerians would be moved into protected villages without a new insurrection breaking out on account of that fact.

    Just talking about the way that we really are. Looking at Nguema’s Equato-Guinea today or tightly controlled states where civilian Presidents were all-powerful dictators whose powers were shored up even further by the unitary system of government where power flowed from the President – such as in 1980s Kenya or Cameroon, the governments had the power of life and death.

    The absence of that ‘enabling environment’ which sufficed in Moi’s Kenya as described by D-E-S does not now exist in the new multiparty democratic space of Kenya. That could be why he is not seeing the ‘highly effective internal security paradigms’ at play anymore. Moi led a police state, Kibaki does not. It is as simple as that.
    Arbitary action is not so permissible now.

    In Nigeria, we never came close to having such a tightly controlled space until Abacha, the likeliest ruler who would have arrogated such powers to himself, but he was resisted in the Niger Delta and in the Southwest. Otherwise, Abacha would have moved everyone out of Ogoniland back then.

  8. beegeagle says:

    D-E-S, what do you mean ‘good intentions..so and so, so?’. You posted and I published unedited – so what was that other tirade about? I need to know because I really think you are now starting to push it. What are you antagonising me for at this time?

    You need to get a grip now, buddy. All these things which you are so eager to say, how many responses have you even received yet I continue to post your comments? So if you were not posting through filters, you would turn yourself to the rabble rouser in here by insulting people at will and throwing tantrums?

    Hmmn..oh well. You tiptoed in here but are pulling out your claws everyday these days. You see why someone asked you to step back from sneak attacks and leave your agenda at the door last time?You have left Nigeria alone and are now attacking me…

  9. wocon45 says:

    ha..ha.. @beegeagle and D-E-S…. laugh wan kill me, two extreme characters.

  10. peccavi says:

    @ Oga Beeg: I dey try reach your standard small small!
    The distances you have quoted are exactly the problem with the situation, I don’t have enough information about the terrain and area to do a proper assessment but to properly garrison that area is in my mind at minimum a divisional tasking.
    I am completely against the concept of protected villages, less from a military point of view because militarily they make sense but as an African I cannot in good conscience compel people to abandon their ancestors land and graves but its still an option especially if there is insufficient manpower.
    We also cannot denude our conventional strength. It is inconceivable that we will face a major conventional threat but it is no impossible, once we lose that capability it will take years to regain it.
    We cannot expand our army exponentially as it will be a massive drain on the treasury, but if we lose the North east we will lose the centre and the middle belt will boil.
    Desertification, the evaporation of Lake Chad in addition to all the normal Naija wahala and the Northern Nigeria wahala make this a classic ungoverned space.
    @D E S: I don’t want to enter the Nigeria/ Kenya my balls are bigger debate but Kenya is slightly different on the land issue than Nigeria. Due to long term European settlement and wholesale land clearing to allow them have their farms etc, land clearance is not a new or dramatic thing. In Nigeria it would be an issue, especially if it was messed up.

    In essence we need to generate at least 10,000 troops or so to hold that area. And as I’ve said many times its not just the killing and chasing stuff but development, train people up and initiate tree planting schemes, get them involved in road building etc

    The Mali/ BH dynamic is very interesting and not positive for Nigeria. There will be a deal most likely and the problem will move south.

    • jimmy says:

      “Oga BEEAGLE “I suggest that two of these armored and artillery formations be replaced with COIN-biased/SF battalions which should be comprised of no less than 25 platoons each”
      The distances are truly STUPEFYING /Mind boggling to comprehend , however this is the one thing you said that i disagree with. This area of operation and the future of security . challenges call for a division to be granted that caters solely to COIN operations not battalions or platoons, because this specific area has a chronic history of problems that are not in any shape of form related to poverty I believe we all agree on that.
      The F.G. itself recognized this, my personal problem is the implementation. I agree with the rotation out of a coin division that oga peccavi advocated however i do not agree with an interior force because like in pakistan/Egypt/ Northern Ireland they are regarded as highly susceptible to corruption , getting constantly ambushed and infiltrated.
      Let the coin division be highly trained consisting of three/ four brigades each of which will rotate out into the field every six months.
      I am not going to preach to someone who has had bullets/ rpgs whizzing by his head……but this is an unconventional / unorthodox insurgency add to this the foreign element involved( thank god we have gotten past that useless argument ;( thinking outside the box must be combined with conventional thinking.
      b.h. must know regardless that there is no safe haven for them S.F. MUST BE TRAINED TO slip into Niger/Mali/ Cameroon, take care of business and come back.
      I agree completely about the f.g. / state govt must make it a priority on infrastructure
      development but no amount of Marshall like plan will be good enough for the hardline faction they need to be taken out- an a permanent COIN division needs to be established as Nigeria’s sixth division.

  11. beegeagle says:

    Oga Jimmy, I was actually talking about what to do in the lead-up to the formation of that new COIN-biased infantry division…not foreclosing the necessity for same.

    The fact we are going to have the new division is almost incontrovertible. What they are doing now is simply putting the structures in place and hopefully, they would be taking delivery of the M-LPVs abd MRAPs as well. They need to start off on an ideal note.

    On this blog in 2012, we have brought you news reports and manufacturer’s statements indicating that the Nigerian defence and security forces shall be entering into contracts for or taking delivery of

    - Oshkosh SandCat M-LPV
    - Mahindra Marksman M-LPV
    - Springbuck VI MRAPs

    MAHINDRA MARKSMAN

    http://beegeagle.wordpress.com/2012/05/22/are-nigeria-lined-up-to-receive-mahindra-marksman-light-mine-protected-patrol-vehicles/

    OSHKOSH SANDCAT

    http://beegeagle.wordpress.com/2012/01/27/procurement-news-nigeria-expecting-ultramodern-oshkosh-sandcat-tactical-protector-vehicles/

    SPRINGBUCK VI MRAPs

    http://beegeagle.wordpress.com/2012/10/10/procurement-news-nigeria-expecting-springbuck-vi-and-mountain-lion-mraps/

    In closing, that new division would most probably swing into action next year. The new division-equivalents of the NAF and the NN, the Air Mobility Command and the Central Naval Command have already taken off in 2011 and 2012 respectively.

  12. beegeagle says:

    Which standard be dat :)? Notin do you, Peccavi.

    I am all for the creation of a DIVISION in NE Nigeria and even articulated stuff about that well over a year ago.

    Excerpts:

    The AOR of 3 Armoured Div touches on some towns which are a full 900-1,000km apart in terms of road distance eg Gembu to Arege or Arege and Shendam. That AOR is as large as Poland or Cote d’Ivoire. That is too much for one division to handle since it is not an empty quarter such as we have in the saharan Adrar or Tamanrasset Prefectures in the Far South of Algeria.

    In the light of contemporary challenges, a well drilled infantry division should be formed in the outer states of the Northeast (Yobe,Borno and Adamawa),leaving 3 Armoured Div with
    an AOR that spans Bauchi,Taraba,Gombe,Plateau and Nasarawa states. The only difference is that, in line with our peculiar realities, the said infantry division should have

    *an infantry brigade at Maiduguri incorporating two counterinsurgency-biased battalions at MDGR, a desert warfare battalion at Damasak,an artillery regiment at Biu and a tank battalion at Bama – five battalions+Bde HQ Garrison since Borno is equal in size to Rwanda,Burundi and The Gambia put together and shares borders with three countries)

    *an infantry brigade with HQ in Damaturu with a desert warfare battalion at Yusufari, counterinsurgency-biased battalion at Damaturu and an armoured battalion at Potiskum plus Bde HQ Garrison.

    *an infantry brigade with an airborne battalion+Bde HQ at Yola, a mountain warfare battalion at Madagali, an armoured battalion at Numan and an artillery regiment at Mubi

    **Division HQ Garrison at Maiduguri with all elements in tow – Base Ammo
    Depot, Div Signals, Div Engineers, Provost battalion, S & T battalion, MI Group, Recce Bn etc

  13. peccavi says:

    In essence what we are calling for is a new Light infantry division specifically geared towards COIN.
    My personal preference is that they be police or police type purely for the reason that constantly deploying soldiers internally is a sign of poor governance.
    Interestingly enough many European nations have an armed/ ‘heavy’ police such as the Gendamerie in France Carabinieri in Italy, Civil Police in Spain etc.
    These are all deployed overseas, for example I met the Carabinieri in Iraq and a friend worked with Gendamerie in Afghanistan.
    I’m not really familiar with their training but I cite them as example of police units that are used in an peace support role.
    Thus if we have a dedicated COIN division or a dedicated COIN police they could be used internally or deployed for PSO missions to Sudan, Somalia etc again taking pressure of the Nigerian Army

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