An Otokar Cobra APC of the Nigerian Army
CHANNELS TELEVISION, LAGOS
12 December, 2012
The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Admiral Ola Sa’ad Ibrahim has announced that Nigeria is relating with neighbouring countries like Chad, Cameroon and Niger Republic with a view to fighting terrorism in the northern part of the country. Admiral Ibrahim urged security forces in the north eastern part of the country to be alert and abide by the rules of engagement.
He made the call during a visit to the headquarters of the Joint Task Force
(JTF) in Damaturu, the capital of Yobe
state. Admiral Ibrahim had earlier visited the JTF headquarters in Borno
state. The Chief of Defence Staff, on arrival in Damaturu, was received by senior military officers. Accompanied by the Inspector General of Police, Mr Abubakar Mohammed, Admiral Ibrahim charged officers of the JTF to be law abiding in the discharge of their duties.
The CDS who was visiting the volatile
northeastern part of the country to assess military formations as well as
evaluate the security situation in the
region, is optimistic that the Federal
Government will win the war against terrorism. The visit of the defence chief to the states is to boost the morale of the officers and men of the Joint Task
Force that has been deployed to the
northeast geopolitical zone of the
country.
While congratulating JTF over its gallantry, he thanked them for the
selfless service to their fatherland and
urged them to sustain the tempo. Addressing the JTF officers in Damaturu and Maiduguri, the CDS noted that the military has made sacrifices to ensure the incessant cases of terrorists’ attacks within the affected areas are resolved, pointing out that all efforts will be made to ensure success.
He said with the support of the two state governors and those of the residents, the case of the insurgents
will soon be a thing of the past as he
urged residents of the states to recognise the good work the officers are doing towards the restoration of
peace in the area.
Speaking to journalists after the address the CDS said the war against the insurgents has already been won and with the efforts the JTF is making, all these challenges will soon be over.
Beegeagle's Blog 
Is Boko Haram More Dangerous Than Ever?
By Scott Stewart
Vice President of Analysis
On Nov. 25, Boko Haram, an Islamist militant group from northern Nigeria, attacked a church in Jaji, Kaduna state, using two suicide bombers during the church’s weekly religious service. The first bomb detonated in a vehicle driven into the church, and the second detonated approximately 10 minutes later, when a crowd of first responders gathered at the scene. About 30 people were killed in the attacks; the second blast caused the majority of the deaths. The incident was particularly symbolic because Jaji is the home of Nigeria’s Armed Forces Command and Staff College, and many of the churchgoers were senior military officers.
In the wake of the Jaji attacks, media reports quoted human rights groups saying that Boko Haram has killed more people in 2012 than ever before. The group has killed roughly 770 people this year, leading many to conclude that Boko Haram has become more dangerous.
However, it is important to look beyond the sheer number of fatalities when drawing such conclusions about a group like Boko Haram. Indeed, a less cursory look at the group reveals that while 2012 has been a particularly deadly year, the Nigerian government has curtailed the group’s capabilities. In terms of operational planning, the group has been limited to simple attacks against soft targets in or near its core territory. In other words, Boko Haram remains deadly, but it is actually less capable than it used to be, relegating the group to a limited, regional threat unless this dynamic is somehow altered.
Boko Haram’s Rise
Boko Haram, Hausa for “Western Education is Sinful,” was established in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of Nigeria’s Borno state. It has since spread to several other northern and central Nigerian states. Its official name is “Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad,” Arabic for “Group Committed to Propagating the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad.” While Boko Haram is a relatively new phenomenon, Nigeria has struggled with militant Islamism for decades. For example, the “Maitatsine” sect, led by Mohammed Marwa, fomented violence in the early 1980s in the very same cities that Boko Haram is presently active.
Initially, Boko Haram incited sectarian violence and attacked Christians with clubs, machetes and small arms. But by 2010, the group had added Molotov cocktails and simple improvised explosive devices to its arsenal. In 2011, Boko Haram made a major operational leap when it unexpectedly began to use large suicide vehicle bombs. They were used first in the botched attack against the national police headquarters in Abuja in June 2011, and they were later used in the more successful attack against a U.N. compound in Abuja in August 2011.
The leap from simple attacks in Boko Haram’s core areas to sophisticated attacks using large vehicle bombs in the nation’s capital skipped several steps in the normal progression of militant operations. The group’s progression suggested that it had received outside training or assistance. The sudden increase in operational capacity appeared to have corroborated reports circulating at that time of Boko Haram militants attending training camps run by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
This rapid progression, which came in the wake of a Nigerian operative being involved in al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s plot to bomb a Detroit-bound airliner, led to a concern that Boko Haram had the capability and the intent to become the next transnational jihadist franchise capable of threatening the United States and Europe. These fears were further stoked by warnings from the U.S. government in November 2011 that Boko Haram was planning to attack Western hotels in Abuja.
Dynamic Changes
To counter the perceived growing Boko Haram threat, the Nigerian government, aided by intelligence and training provided by the United States and its European allies, launched a major offensive against the group. Since January, the government has arrested or killed several leaders of Boko Haram, disrupted a number of cells and dismantled numerous bombmaking facilities. In addition to government efforts, there has been a grassroots backlash against Boko Haram, as evidenced by the formation of anti-Boko Haram militant group Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan or “Supporters of Muslims in the Lands of Sudan,” commonly known as Ansaru.
Boko Haram has lashed out viciously against these countermeasures. From June to August, the group conducted nine suicide bombings, mostly directed against churches and police or military targets in its home territory. Since August, the operational tempo of its suicide bombings has slowed to about one attack a month. Boko Haram operatives have also conducted a number of armed attacks and non-suicide bombing attacks. Many of these were directed against churches and police or military targets, but several of them were also directed against mosques that denounced Boko Haram. Despite warnings that Boko Haram would target Western hotels in Abuja, the group has not attacked an international target since the U.N. building in August 2011.
Boko Haram activity has remained heavily concentrated in its core areas with occasional operations in Abuja. There have been only two Boko Haram attacks in Abuja in 2012: a large suicide vehicle bombing attack against a newspaper office in April and a small bombing attack against a nightclub in June. It appears that the group’s ability to conduct large attacks in Abuja has been constrained by government operations.
Tactically, Boko Haram’s attacks in 2012 have focused almost exclusively on soft targets. Even its attacks against military and police targets have been directed against police on patrol or isolated police stations with little security or have been a target like the church at the military base in Jaji.
So while Boko Haram progressed rapidly in terms of operational ability in 2011, it is still struggling to conduct sustained operations outside its core geographic territory, and it has yet to successfully strike a hardened target. Even the August 2011 attack against the United Nations, while demonstrating some geographic reach and a focus on an international target, was directed against a relatively soft target instead of a harder target like a government ministry building or a foreign embassy. It is also notable that the group has not conducted an attack in Lagos, Nigeria’s most populous city, or in Niger, Chad or Cameroon, which are all closer to the Boko Haram home territories than Lagos.
However, in Nigeria, the use of militant proxies has long been part of the political process. Just as Niger Delta politicians have used groups like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta for their own purposes, politicians in Nigeria’s northeast have supported and used Boko Haram. In fact, an alleged senior member of the group was arrested at the home of a Nigerian senator in Maiduguri in October 2012, and a previous governor of Borno state is allegedly a sponsor of the group.
This type of political and financial support means that despite the efforts of the central government, the group will not be easily or quickly eradicated. Any serious attempt to curtail the group will require a political solution, which will be highly unlikely during the next two years due to the usefulness of such proxies in the lead-up to Nigerian national elections in early 2015. Therefore, the central government’s options will be limited. The best it can hope for is to continue to pursue the group to contain it and limit its reach and lethality.
Certainly, Boko Haram retains the capability to kill people, especially in attacks against vulnerable targets on its home turf. But as long as the Nigerian government maintains pressure on the group and as long as the group remains on the defensive, Boko Haram is unlikely to be able to further develop its operational capabilities and pose an existential threat to the Nigerian government — let alone become a transnational terrorist threat.
“Is Boko Haram More Dangerous Than Ever? is republished with permission of Stratfor.”
Read more: Is Boko Haram More Dangerous Than Ever? | Stratfor
Read more: Is Boko Haram More Dangerous Than Ever? | Stratfor
This at least represents an attempt by someone in the western media to factual ( honest) and objective. Thank you very much oga peccavi for sharing this with us.
The difference between boutique journalism and analysis
Its a pleasant surprise that some people over there are not just looking, but they are seeing.
Welldone Stratfor.
Thanks to oga peccavi.
The otokar cobra is just simply made of the chassis of a landrover defender that was just given another body how hard can it be for our military to buy landrover chassis and then amour them themselves. They are not thinking rationally.
Guys,just imagine a scenerio where the CDS comes to the hot beds of Boko haram as he just did,which is very commendable and he hands down a surprise to them,300 units of MRAP’s,can we begin to fathom the morale wud have been boosted by this action?,that’s wat motivation is all about.
And wetin the MRAP wan do? It will tell you the difference between a Boko Haram terrorist and an ordinary citizen?
Or detect a bomb at 300m? Abeg
@Cutevik, you are right. there would be an immediate impact on the moral, and operational abilities of the troops.
We have 2 recent examples to study. The provision of MRAPs to AMISOM, and their subsequent performance in somalia.
Also, the difference in morale between the mrap equipped british and americans in iraq versus their iraqi trainees, who like NA, were using pick up trucks.
When the iraqis finally began to properly equip themselves, they were able to perform as well as the coalition troops.
And you think MRAPS had anything to do with an improvement in performance?
You think better training, leadership and equipment as a whole might have been an element?
AMISOM was getting their asses handed to them in Somalia because of a lack of MRAP, or a restrictive mandate and insufficient force numbers?
I will post photos of the vehicles I operated in in both theatres, non were MRAPS, morale was sky high till the end
@ cutievik if that happens ehhhhh….hehehehe i go sow my next salary as seed for the army.
Oga Peccavi, while you lived the entire experience, I was just a mere observer.
However, I remember saying to myself, why are the americans complaining of the Iraqi lack of resolve, when they rode in up armoured vehicles, and the iraqis initially accompanied them in technicals?
I wonder what would have happened to the coalition resolve/morale, if they traded vehicles with their iraqi counterparts ?
The British in Basra really never faced the IED threat which the US had to contend with in the Sunni triangle and the Baghdad environs and when they started facing hostility from Sadr’s men, they hunkered down and stopped patrolling. Hence, ceding the streets to the rule of the militias.
In Afghanistan, the Brits in the Helmand Province, came face to face with both insurgent assaults, and an IED campaign, imported from Iraq. For all their training, discipline under fire and courage, their lack of MRAPs and helicopters, and it’s detriment to operations was glaring.
I recall when a very popular UK Lieutenant Colonel was killed by an IED, while riding in the much vaunted dual amphibious tractor used by the royal marines comandos.
There was an uproar in London, concerning the lack of UK investment in life saving MRAPs and helicopters like their US counterparts.
The UK has had to adapt to the US MRAP style of operation, to succeed in afghanistan. And in basra where they did not, all their prowess as good soldiers was not sufficient to patrol and dominate the place. As the UK withdrew, the Badr brigade dominated iraqi military with US air and US/UK spec ops backing, had to go and retake basra from the Sadrists.
Bros, my experience was a snapshot and the vehicles I rode in were death traps, which cost the lives of a lot of British soldiers. The point I was making is that the vehicles were not the issue, discipline, training and leadership are a function of capability not equipment. The Saudi’s have the most high tech kit in the world, higher specs than western stuff but they are still useless as a military.
The issues with the Iraqi army are multi faceted but essentially there was no plan for training them, training that was conducted was ad hoc, they were exceptionally badly equipped with shit rifles. Imagine in a country awash with weapons I visited one location where the men had rusty AK’s with broken magazines. The army and police were penetrated thoroughly by the militias. they were then being thrown straight into the fight without any time to get their lives together. Their lives and their families were at risk.
Equipment and/ or MRAPS were only one part of the story. it was a story of incompetence, corruption, tribal politics, incompetence, hubris, incompetence and stupidity. MRAPs were unimportant.
And although Basra was not in the Sunni triangle it was next to Iran, the Shia militias were better organised and equipped than the Sunnis (hence why they won) and they are ferocious. The EFP IED which can defeat any armoured vehicle (even your beloved MRAPs) was first used and most used down in Basra, barely making it further north.
The British tactics in Basra were due purely to low force numbers. With more men we could have held Basra, Al Amarah, As Zubair etc. The force numbers were kept low by politicians and the Generals were to cowardly and career shy to challenge this, thus the British Army was for all intents and purposes defeated in Basra.
Force numbers alone would not have won the campaign but it would have needed more honourably.Even the US with its tons of equipment only withdrew by striking deals with the Shias, exploiting the revolt by the Sunnis against Al Qaeda and then running away while the going was good. Essentially what the Brits did but countrywide.
The Viking you refer to is an armoured amphibious tractor not an APC of IFV it is for transport not fighting.
Again the issue in Afghanistan is force numbers not kit. We have tons of new vehicles, they still can get taken out and still do as the strike on the warrior shows. An MRAP just needs a larger IED that’s all.
With more men, early in the campaign Helmand would have been pacified, the original plan called for an incremental expansion, was very measured and sensible. The Commander at the time under pressure from the Afghan governor instituted the platoon house policy spreading men out to thinly to be effective as anything other than bullet magnets. It is a glorious chapter in the British Army’s history as we did not lose a single location and comprehensively defeated the Taliban in every single engagement. They were decimated, which is why they went IED happy after 2008. However glorious defensive actions do not win wars and the Taliban were defeated tactically but adapted operationally and retook the initiative from ISAF. The US Marines that came in did exactly what we did, bought some time but they did not defeat the Taliban.
The US with their vehicle centred tactics have had no greater impact than the Brits just increased force numbers means they can spread out more, yet they have not changed the game, just brought time for the training of Afghan troops, handover and withdrawal
THE GREAT MRAP DEBATE
http://defense.aol.com/2012/10/01/the-great-mrap-debate-are-blast-resistant-vehicles-worth-it/
COUNTERING IEDs
http://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/military/countering-ieds/0
US MARINES IN ANBAR PROVINCE: NO LOSS OF LIVES SUSTAINED BY TROOPS IN MRAPs IN 300 ATTACKS
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-04-18-marines-new-vehicles_N.htm
IS AN IFV AN MPV/MRAP OR VICE VERSA ?? – EEBEN BARLOW
http://eebenbarlowsmilitaryandsecurityblog.blogspot.com/2009/10/is-ifv-mpvmrap-or-visa-versa.html?m=1
D-E-S says
Nicely done @Peccavi @Henry…
One clearly sees that we’ve identified a
divergence in US and UK deployment
and CT-COIN engagement doctrines, at
least during the formative early years.
Clearly the Brits had to adapt to a disposition almost similar to the US
‘expeditionary approach’. The US in
turn had learned and perfected this
approach from brutal lessons learned
from Somalia.
The emergent post Somalia expeditionary ‘blueprint’ was passed/shared/or realised on to
AMISOM II with great success. @peccavi
has in the past mentioned this before
on here and perhaps it needs further
discussing, how will the Nigerian civil
and public respond to an up scaled use of militarised behemoths like Puma,
Mamba, Oshkosh MRAP’s et al…
Based on what I’ve seen in other places facing similar challenges, it has the potential to escalate perceptions and their- attendant actions/reactions….just my humble opinion!!
Mamba MRAPs, Puma, Springbuck VI and Otokar Cobra are all protected to the SAME STANAG Level 1. None represents a marked leap forward from the other, whether they bear the name APC or MRAP. If it has to do with the V-hulls and wheel arches intended for the deflection of blast fragments, the V-hull of the Otokar is apparently more pronounced than all of the foregoing.
Show me the rear ends of the Mamba, Puma and Springbuck VI.
If the CTCOIN gameplan is to field ‘innocuous’ looking vehicles, the Otokar Cobra does not look too menacing while the Springbuck VI looks truly ‘harmless’. The said Otokar Cobra and the Panhard VBL are the mainstay armoured vehicles used by the Army in CTCOIN operations in Nigeria as of now.
What would represent a bold leap forward would be the injection of more Casspir and GILA MRAPs – no less. Those can withstand blasts which are two times more intense. As we speak, the Casspir is the primary APC used by the Police Anti Terrorism Squad while the sturdy AutoKraz truck is their mainline truck.
I took the photo above myself. That is a Casspir.
SPRINGBUCK VI MRAPs on order
The Police Mobile Force(MOPOL) chiefly use Alvis Saxon, UR 416, Streit Spartan Mk.II, Springbuck, Streit Cougar Mk.II, Alpine and Otokar Cobra APCs. There are an assortment of lesser known types also in service which are typically given by the assortment of state governments as tokens of operational support.
The Police Anti Bomb Squad use Casspir and Otokar APCs.
Nigerians have already received the Casspir and Otokar Cobra well. What else is new?
D-E-S says
@Beeg..Quote]…”The Police Mobile Force(MOPOL) chiefly use Alvis Saxon, UR 416, Streit Spartan Mk.II, Springbuck, Streit Cougar Mk.II, Alpine and Otokar Cobra APCs. There are an assortment of lesser known types also in service which are typically given by the assortment of state governments as tokens of operational support. The Police Anti Bomb Squad use Casspir and Otokar APCs.Nigerians have already received the Casspir and Otokar Cobra well. What else is new?”…[End quote]
I like the Otokar APC it does seem to
have a profile that is conducive to a
civil police type APC, as for the Casspir
it’s a proven civil police platform,brilliant for that function, especially on the high-end or active response civil
functions (riot control, insertion/
extractions etc.)
But lets’ be earnest and consistent in
our discussions for the sake of the
listening policy makers out there….
Question;
1. Does Maiduguri and the vicinity of
North Nigeria still experience more
IED’s than the entirety of Somalia, as I
recall you inferring that?
2. How many Road-side IED deaths have we had in this area alone for the
last, say 6 months?
3. Considering that MOPOL has such an
impressive collection of APC platforms,
are they all deployed in the areas that
were hit by the devastating IED’s?
4. What is the standing operational
orders/policy in this area(s), in regards
to civil and routine patrol, civil
emergency and community response?
And how are they been impacted by
increased IED prevalence?
5. I don’t live in the north of Nigeria or
Nigeria at large, but for those of us
that do or have visited there lately, how
is the influx of all this APC’s, IFV’s and
non-civil type patrol/response
platforms affecting the concerned communities or even the police
themselves?
Yes, it is official and the assessment was not done by me. In 2011, the heaviest number of IED incidents took place in Nigeria. Note IEDs..scarcely ever heard about a grenade attack. Points to the resourcefulness, skills and ingenuity of the extremely prolific IED-making habits of Nigerian terrorists.
But here are the statistics on IED attacks across Africa.
DEPLOYMENT
Men of the Police Mobile Force(MOPOL) advance atop an Otokar Cobra APC
MOPOL Otokar Cobra APC in Kaduna, NW Nigeria and scene of several suicide attacks this year. No Otokar, civil or military, destroyed thus far
POLICE ANTI BOMB SQUAD in Abuja, central Abuja
(possibly rely on Casspir and Otokar Cobra alone because of the need to survive blasts if and when they occur. None lost to IED blasts as yet)
Men of the Nigeria Police Anti-Bomb Squad watch as a mine-protected Otokar Cobra APC drives past
MOPOL IN BAUCHI, NE NIGERIA in Alvis Saxon APCs (none lost to IEDs as yet)
An Alvis Saxon mine-resistant APC of the Police Mobile Force(MOPOL)
COUGAR Mk.II Light Armoured Vehicle – used by MOPOL in Abuja and on the Jos Plateau. None recorded as being lost to IEDs.
JOS PLATEAU
(no Army Otokar Cobra or Panhard VBL lost as yet)
Troops and Panhard VBL M11 scout car of the STF on urban CTCOIN operations on the Jos Plateau
Urban operations: An Army Otokar Cobra APC followed by a Police Mobile Force Ford Ranger 4WD truck
The Otokar Cobra and Panhard VBL are in action across the hardest hit areas – Maiduguri, Damaturu, Kano, Kaduna, Jos, Zaria, Potiskum, Mubi, Bauchi etc. We are not losing them.
The only reported damage to the Otokar was recorded during a botched suicide attack at Damaturu in December 2011.
How are they deployed? That was why I posted those photos. You can see that they are deployed everywhere, and I mean everywhere from Maiduguri to Kano, Jos to Kaduna, Abuja to Bauchi, Damaturu to Mubi, Zaria to Potiskum
Following from that, you can see from the photos that the people are going about their normal business and the armoured vehicles are unobtrusive. You can see people milling around and not bothering about the the presence of the vehicles
An imposing 12.7mm HMG-armed Otokar Cobra APC on urban CT-COIN operations in NE Nigeria
An Otokar Cobra APC on urban counterterrorism counterinsurgency patrols
Some welcome the spectacle, gleefully
Appreciative Nigerians wave to a soldier inside an Otokar Cobra APC
Easier said than done. How many hundreds of raids on IED making factories have been conducted already?
While you are waiting to kill them all, the security forces would also get hit in the pursuing vans which the terrorists have identified as the soft underbelly and have now squarely focussed on attacking them? You are advocating a PYRRHIC victory.
Were the world’s most powerful states able to eradicate them in Afghanistan, Waziristan and Iraq? So what gives – in the meantime, you stay like a sitting duck and let them come at you..these guys who know how to make IEDs in canisters and lob them by the dozens during gun battles?
I have spoken about mine-protected vehicles and their survivability. The 4WD vans have been death traps
ATTACKS ON 4WD VANS
http://africanquarters.com/index.php/nigeria-news/1851-6-soldiers-3-civilians-killed-in-suicide-bomb-attack-in-damaturu.html
RAIDS ON IED FACTORIES ARE A WEEKLY EVENT IN NIGERIA. How many thousands of primed IEDs have been seized in raids on many dozens of bomb factories across the north?
Start from here..hoping that you can sustain the count.
https://beegeagle.wordpress.com/?s=IEDs+recovered
Here is a stupefying haul from just one city – KANO
You would catch all of those first before you go get MRAPs for the hunters? Well, America piled on MRAPs in Iraq and Afghanistan – 24,000 units while searching and raiding IED-manufacturing facilities simultaneously…none to the exclusion of the other. Realising the clear and present danger of a backlash against pursuing troops, they did not put their troops in a needlessly perilous position just to prove any point in the CTCOIN rulebook ala ‘draining the swamp’ BECAUSE you do not have to make guinea pigs of the troops to do that.
In a country like Nigeria where willing suicide bombers are as numerous as armed robbers, the will to lob or use roadside IEDs sans suicide attackers against any foolhardy adventurers with heads in the clouds is not nearly lacking and comes as a boon which will be seized with both hands by terrorists.
In the second half of this year, terrorists have stepped up roadside and suicide attacks on 4WD patrol vans. If you crack down harder on IED makers and users whilst rolling around in that joke called a 4WD van, they simply would flatten it for you without any recourse to convoluted permutations. For people who FREELY use suicide bombers, all that they would see are easy targets.Since the fear of death is not a problem for suicide bombers, they would attack as many vulnerable vehicles in sight and further demoralise the already traumatised peoples in conflict zones which would just be ideal for the terrorists…same way they are now deliberately slashing throats,burning GSM masts and killing civilians as security forces harden more attractive targets.
That idea of holding off MRAPs until you close every IED-manufacturing facility amounts to herding the security forces down a shortcut to suicide. It is shocking to the point of recklessness and disregard for the value of human lives
Let’s keep it real.
D-E-S | In reply to Beegeagle.
[@Beeg..Quote]…”Note IEDs..scarcely
ever heard about a grenade attack.
Points to the resourcefulness, skills and
ingenuity of the extremely prolific IED-
making habits of Nigerian terrorists”…
[End quote]
This is very concerning….how many
prolific bomb making Nigerian terrorists are there? Do they have some kind of a licensed bomb making madarasa or what?!! Eradicating these ingenious oafs would be my number one priority, way before any MRAP or APC…That is just the way I see it!!!
@D-E-S: the Americans learnt nothing from Somalia other than don’t intervene and don’t take armour into cities. They forgot all their COIN lessons from Vietnam and force protection measures from others. Initially we had the advantage from our NI experience, however where pin NI terrorist evolutions were over 6 months or a year to counter a particular weapon system , in Iraq it was a month or in some cases weeks. The porous borders in Iraq, influx of experienced foreign fighters, use of the internet and easy accessibility of weapons grade explosives meant that the Iraqi insurgents didn’t need to go through the many normal learning processes.
I will confess that we looked down on the Americans and the mess they were making and figured all was well, because we were better than them rather than because the enemy had not seriously started to fight, thus when the enemy did start to fight in the south, we had not the force numbers or ability to react. The US reacted very quickly (comparatively) in terms of equipment and when they took a look at doctrine and Petraues go involved with his excellent treatise, they completely changed the game.
The British were still talking about Northern Ireland when we couldn’t go to the Basra flats without tanks.
Yet even with all this new kit, new tactics, the tide did not turn until the Sunnis turned against Al Qaeda and formed an alliance with the US and the Shias negotiated a ceasefire.
In other words the US simply co-opted its enemies long enough to run away.
MRAPs, like jammers, like metal detectors, like body armour, like helmets are tools. Only as good as the men who use them, the men who lead them and the men who define the mission and give the orders.
D-E-S | In reply to beegeagle. @Beeg..Quote]…
”The Police Mobile Force(MOPOL) chiefly use Alvis Saxon, UR 416, Streit Spartan Mk.II, Springbuck, Streit Cougar Mk.II, Alpine and Otokar Cobra APCs. There are an assortment of lesser known types also in service which are typically given by the assortment of state governments
as tokens of operational support. The
Police Anti Bomb Squad use Casspir and
Otokar APCs.Nigerians have already
received the Casspir and Otokar Cobra well. What else is new?”…[End quote]
3. Considering that MOPOL has such an
impressive collection of APC platforms,
are they all deployed in the areas that
were hit by the devastating IED’s?
4. What is the standing operational orders/policy in this area(s), in regards
to civil and routine patrol, civil
emergency and community response?
And how are they been impacted by
increased IED prevalence?
@Beeg..Quote]…”Were the world’s most powerful states able to eradicate
them in Afghanistan, Waziristan and
Iraq? So what gives – in the meantime,
you stay like a sitting duck and let
them come at you..these guys who
know how to make IEDs in canisters and lob them by the dozens during gun
battles? I have spoken about mine-
protected vehicles and their
survivability. The 4WD vans have been
death traps”…[End quote]
…What is your argument based on really? Your above statement illustrates
that you believe there are plenty of
operational platforms available to the
JSTF. But then on the other hand you
are implying that they are not in
operational use…this is the inconsistencies that I am referring to,
which is which? Or else you are venting
about the operational tactical policy in
regards to their inadequate
deployment in area in question?
I have nowhere suggested that they are not in operational use, D-E-S. Northern Nigeria is larger than Afghanistan+Waziristan combined and is 1.75 times the size of Iraq. Yet, did you read the report above where 1000 MRAPs where earmarked for Anbar Province alone?
I posted to show you that none of those vehicles would ‘alarm’ anyone and go against the grain of textbook CTCOIN operations with reference to the need to look ‘benign’.
What we have said and always stated is that they are not enough. It is a very wide and active frontline with an acute need for manning and mollifying shows of force. The road distance between Jaji and Gamboru-Ngala, both of which witnessed attacks these past three weeks is 925 kms. Figure that out. Everywhere in between is a potential flashpoint – Zaria, Kano, Bauchi, Nguru, Bulkachuwa, Damaturu, Potiskum, Maiduguri, Dikwa and hundreds of villages and towns in between. These terrorists move into any unmanned spaces and will attack citizens if they do not find a police station.
I have always said put more men and put more machines on the ground. And no – none of the referenced armoured vehicles would alarm anybody.
I have told you how they are deployed – you can see an Otokar engaging in high visibility patrols, a static Panhard and they are used when conducting raids during which armed resistance occurs. What else is there to say about the deployment which is not visible from the photos?
HOW can all the vehicles be all deployed in the North? Some are in the Niger Delta, a region with about 25 million people. Others are in the Southeast and Southwest deployed for even anti-robbery operations. Armed robbers here do use GPMGs and RPGs if they have to and this is why they buy these APCs for them. So the state governments which bought them to assist the operations of the Police in their states would have them serve their own constituents FIRST.
What’s obfuscated about the foregoing? Over a year ago, Beegeagle wrote
QUOTE
We have been shouting ourselves hoarse about the need to replace those 4WD Toyota and Ford Ranger trucks which we see everywhere in Borno with Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. At the moment and in a theatre where ambushes and the use of roadside IEDs,bombs and lobbed grenades are the reality of life, how come 4WDs still outnumber MRAPs by a ratio of 3:1 or more? Does the fact that a soldier signed up to die mean that he necessarily has to get killed? Is it not unnecessary delays and dilly-dallying of this sort which cost us needless losses of lives during the ECOMOG years? We learnt nothing?
Two days ago, two soldiers lost their lives as the soft-skinned deathtrap they were travelling in drove into an ambush in the distant northeast. There is no way in the world that it would have happened if they had been travelling in MRAPs.
While we are still at it and as the 2012 budget is being put together, it is of the utmost importance that a joint session of the National Assembly to which all service chiefs,GOCs/FOCs/AOCs and branch chiefs(DHQ and service level) should be invited gets convened without further delay. Let the brasshats each be given ten minutes to dissect threats and profer solutions. After two days, the lawmakers should have learnt a lot. It has come to that…in view of the seeming lack of appreciation of military matters which characterise the workings of our National Assembly. Our leaders badly need help whereas their legislative aides and special assitants appear to be clueless.
end of quote
D-E-S In reply to Beegeagle.
@Beeg…Quote]…”RAIDS ON IED
FACTORIES ARE A WEEKLY EVENT IN
NIGERIA. How many thousands of primed
IEDs have been seized in raids on many
dozens of bomb factories across the
north?”…[End quote]
Absolutely, I know that and it’s brilliant.
But what is the nature in complexity IED’s retrieved from these factories? Are they of a high explosive yield and remote/signal control assembly or rudimentary lob types like you described (canisters)? The more complex they are, the larger the collateral damage, but in regards to probabilities the less terrorists with that skill-set available, even within the professionalised ranks….this is when we start asking serious impertinent intelligence based analytical assumptions…..
They use the rudimentary canisters as tactical weapons in lieu of grenades and manufacture those by the high hundreds for use during gun battles.
The roadside IEDs and VBIEDs used by suicide bombers are complex wired devices which are timed or triggered by remote control.
BH are equally comptent..very competent in the production and use of whichever.
*
“15 capacitors, 15 fuses, one electrical detonator, 250m detonating cord”
what do those items tell you – fuses and detonators?
*
” Other items recovered were detonators, remote control devices ”
Here is a haul of IED materiel – detonation cords, fuses, remotely controlled devices
At any level of the trade – IED canisters, timed roadside devices, VBIEDs, BH are fully skilled in all of the above. Even without vehicles, suicide attackers with IEDs strapped to their bodies tried to kill the Shehu of Borno and Emir of Fika in NE Nigeria.
ANY LEVEL – they have produced and detonated already. So far gone and that is why they do not use hand grenades..only RPGs and IEDs.
Read
http://trust.org/alertnet/news/nigeria-seizes-truck-carrying-bomb-making-material/
http://foxnews.com/world/2011/03/23/army-finds-bomb-making-material-central-nigeria/
The items recovered from search-and-bust attacks on IED factories clearly point to the output therefrom. BH possess the full skills-sets required to produce the gamut of IED types..canisters, remotely detonated and timed IEDs, VBIEDs..the works!
” 24 units of primed IED gas cylinders, a dozen IED remote control switches, six assorted IED and incendiary materials and chemicals,15 small primed IED cans”
“17 sensor mechanical timers(remote
controls), 11 primed suicide bombers
vests, seven rolls of wires of various
lengths, one bag containing several
sensors and 25 nine volt batteries ”
” two bags of TNT, ready-made IEDs, remote control bombs, gas cylinders, 100 detonator heads”
“Items recovered included 35 low-calibre IEDs(improvised explosive devices), five high-calibre remote control IEDs”
D-E-S In reply to Peccavi.
@Peccavi…I hardly want to start a stampede of counter opinions regarding the doctrinal baseline efficacies of UK or US SF ‘fighting standpoint’. And yes I do agree with you about the significant pace of enemy evolution cycles on armament,tactics and technical knowledge in Iraq as opposed to NI was initially a problem to the Brits. US SF baseline fighting doctrines are so heavily borrowed from their Ranger formations, they are over compartmentalised and most of their typical SF formations are not able to self-sustain for prolonged COIN missions like a typical Brit formation, so they come light in gear but heavily supported, they are very manoeuvrable though in speed and force….Very true,deny them space (CQB) use of CAS and ranging and you got them on a level-ish keel, although they are known to travel in coy of some serious brush-stroke painters (Damn compartmentalists !!..lool)….
@Peccavi…Quote]…”MRAPs, like jammers, like metal detectors, like
body armour, like helmets are tools.Only as good as the men who use them, the men who lead them and the men who define the mission and give the orders”…[End quote]
I couldn’t agree more….which takes me
back to an understanding you shared
on here that is worthy further discussing as I am of an opinion it’s significant.
November 8, 2012 at 12:23 pm
@Peccavi…Quote]…”This has been
covered previously. You will never have
enough MRAPs for all occasions just modify tactics and procedures. And this
stupid shooting after an incident has to
stop. Its not just a waste of ammo and
poor discipline as well as a danger to
innocent civilians it prevents a proper
follow up to the incident”…[End quote]
https://beegeagle.wordpress.com/2012/11/08/convoy-of-military-patrol-vans-
evades-roadside-ied-blasts-at-mubi-2-
civilians-killed-children-hurt-2/
Concerning joint operations, the military and police are too used to working together. For many years, the military ruled Nigeria and even as the Police bore responsibility for policing the civil populace, military regimes never failed to deploy troops when matters got out of hand on a monumental scale..to firm up the hands and the capacity of the Police and that has also happened frequently under democratic rule, pursuant the ‘aid to civil authorities’ function of the military. Civilian rulers actually used the military to fulfill this constitutional role, first
– during the agrarian and grassroots revolts against the enthronment of unpopular leaders in Western Nigeria namely “Operation Weti-e” and in the Tiv Division of Northern Nigeria in 1964-66, the civilian FG government called in the military to help in stabilising the situation.
– during 1966-67 pogroms which ultimately nosedived into the Civil War after 30,000 persons had been killed in widespread violence in the North, the military which took power in January 1966 also used soldiers to stabilise the situation, working alongside the Police.
– in 1980 when an Islamist uprising in Kano led to the deaths of 4,177 over a 2-week period, the military were drafted in to help the Police calm the situation.The leader of that rebellion, Maitatsine was killed. We had an elected government at the helm.
– all through the military interregnum of 1984-99, all episodes of widespread violence – in NW Nigeria in 1987, in Zangon Kataf in 1992, in Ogoniland throughout the 1990s, during the 2-year orgy of Ijaw-Itsekiri violence of 1996-97 which sowed the seeds, in terms of knowhow and resourcing, and marked the effective start of the militarisation of the Niger Delta conflict which culminated in the launch of MEND’s insurgency in January 2006, the military virtually took over the role of enforcement of law and order in undeclared states of emergency.
– in 2009 when BH instigated massive uprisings which led to the deaths of 800 persons across the Far North of Nigeria, the military came in to stabilise the situation after the Police had become overwhelmed by the sheer scale of the organised violence. The leader of the revolt, Mohammed Yusuf was captured by the military and handed over to the Police. He died in police custody, believed to have been executed. At the time, we had an elected government at the helm.
So Nigerians are totally used to joint police-military ops and often call for the military and police to work together in times of major crises and breakdown of law and order, let alone during insurgencies such as in the Niger Delta and in northern Nigeria. It is a perfectly NORMAL spectacle which alarms nobody here in Nigeria. They see it as a pragmatic approach which works for us.
Neither is the sight of Police APCs anything new. MOPOL have used APCs since they received their Saxon APCs in 1984 and UR 416 APCs a short time later. Nigerians saw them deployed throughout the 1984-99 military interregnum in conflict zones and see them as perfectly normal spectacles during times of crises, never mind during ‘wars and insurgencies’ marked by gun battles and IED blasts.
Again look at the photos and see people going about unperturbed in the shadow of APCs. This is the narrative while the pictures above tell the story eloquently. Against CTCOIN precepts, you can actually see people in conflict zones jubilating at the sight of military APCs – never mind those owned by the Police ATS/ABS/MOPOL.
That is the inexplicable nay confounding NIGERIAN reality.
I note however that beyond these 275 units of Otokar Cobra APC and Panhard VBL scout cars, the military have never deployed any other APCs, of which there are well over 600 units of MT-LB, BTR 70/BTR-3, MOWAG, Steyr 4K 7FA, M3, Urutu, against Boko Haram. We have also not seen any of her 55 units of 30mm cannon-armed Fox scout cars or her 301 units of Panhard AML 90/Sagaie AFVs, Cascavel and Panhard AML 60s deployed. To that effect, light tanks and MBTs do not even come into it. Neither do artillery weapons nor fighter jets come into it – just helicopters. That might sound strange since the world imagine that we are all brutes in here.
The said Otokar Cobra APCs carry .30 calibre GPMGs and 12.7mm HMGs and no more while the Panhard VBLs carry 12.7mm HMGs. All of that is about minimising collateral damage, making Close Quarter Battles the mainstay activity out here – that is why you always hear about “gun battles” between security forces and insurgents. Not like the military cannot have any troublesome corner flattened from afar by shelling.
This clearly suggests THAT the reliance on Otokar Cobra APCs and Panhard VBLs is as much about presenting that innocuous public face said to be needed for CTCOIN operations as it has to do with maneouvrability and the need to use minimum force in what is in the main, urban guerrilla warfare waged against terrorists embedded in the communities but who do not control an inch of territory.
I so submit.
GPMG is 7.32
7.62
Yeah Peccavi, GPMG is 7.62mm true but it is also a .30 calibre weapon. Same way a 12.7mm HMG is a .50 calibre weapon.
Didn’t say ’30mm GPMG’ because there is nothing like that
Touche.
Although you can have a 30mm cannon which is an extremely awesome infantry support weapon
Absolutely.
We have 23mm and 30mm cannons mounted on Mi-24V and Mi-35P attack helicopters. We have 30mm Emerlec cannons mounted on some 31 metre German and 35 metre British-built patrol craft – the Argungu and Makurdi classes.
Forty of the forty seven BTR-3 APCs acquired a few years ago by the NA carry belong to the U-SERIES(UN/UK/UR) which carry the formidable one-man SHKVAL unified fighting module as which accommodates a number of weapon systems including
– 30mm gun
– 7.62mm coaxial machine gun
– 30mm automatic grenade launcher
– anti-tank guided weapons
(wire-guided Red Arrow missiles of Chinese origin).
Quote
” The module was developed by the State Scientific Technical Centre of Artillery & Rifle Arms of Ukraine. The Shkval fighting module design is very flexible, which makes it possible to easily replace an existing weapon with another one (e.g. wire-guided Red Arrow missiles with laser-beam riding missiles, etc).
” The 30mm dual-feed cannon has 350 rounds of ready-use ammunition. A total of 2,500 rounds are carried for the 7.62mm coaxial machine gun. The 30mm
grenade launcher is mounted on the left
side of the turret, having 29 rounds of
ready-use ammunition, with additional 87 rounds being carried in reserve (three magazines, each containing 29 rounds).
” Six 81mm electrically operated smoke/
aerosol grenade launchers are mounted three either side of the turret rear and firing forwards.
“The sighting systems include a commander’s 1PZ-3 observation
periscope and a TKN-4S Agat stabilised
sight which is integrated with the missile fire control system.”
end of quote