Toyota Landcruiser 4WD vehicles of the Nigerian Army in Darfur

Toyota Landcruiser 4WD vehicles of the Nigerian Army in Darfur

A Nigerian UNAMID peacekeeper mans a GPMG mounted on an Otokar Cobra APC

A Nigerian UNAMID peacekeeper mans a GPMG mounted on an Otokar Cobra APC

A convoy of Toyota Landcruiser and Hilux 4WD trucks of the Nigerian Army in Darfur, Sudan

A convoy of Toyota Landcruiser and Hilux 4WD trucks of the Nigerian Army in Darfur, Sudan


About beegeagle

BEEG EAGLE -perspectives of an opinionated Nigerian male with a keen interest in Geopolitics, Defence and Strategic Studies
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  1. rka says:

    A step in the right direction. Well done FG.

  2. Oga beeg sorry cos the link will be tantamount to derailing the thread but i could not help taking note of one of the eye witnesses’ comment that the air strikes started in the night and ragged till dawn. My question is could he be right? Do we have such assets dat can carry out night ops? or probably the eye witness was confusing shelling for airstrikes?

  3. beegeagle says:

    The NAF have military variant Agusta A109 LUH helics which, armed with FLIR devices, could undertake night attacks. The number of A-Jet which have been been conclusively upgraded since 2011 is 13 units (less one which crashed in Niger)…four units first in Q3 2011, nine units a few months ago in September.

    Initially, we heard that each A-Jet was upgraded for US$600,000 but a FEC communique seen subsequently shows that each unit was upgraded at a cost of over US$1 million. For that outlay on each jet, it is not unfathomable that they possess night-fighting capabilities. We already know that they now have six pylons each as against the original four which they arrived with from the manufacturer.

  4. beegeagle says:

    FOR PROFORCE, IT IS A PROMISE FULFILLED. WE HAVE DONE OUR DUTY…a promise that things shall never be the same again after our expose, has been fulfilled.

    July 15, 2013 at 11:19 am


    “It is up to the Office of the NSA, the Defence Ministry, Police Affairs Ministry, DICON and DHQ to come together and merge the efforts of PROFORCE, NAEME and DICON towards perfecting the work on all Made-in-Nigeria armoured vehicles. PROFORCE come to the board with the business acumen of private sector operators.

    The FG need to place orders, allow them to develop absolute expertise on these systems, improve them as they go on, make the ventures viable on account of patronage and then, because we use them too, CTCOIN-challenged African countries looking for right-priced options (think Mali, Chad, Niger for a start) can be expected to follow suit.

    Let us make sure that this all WORKS out for good. Long live the Federal Republic of Nigeria. ”

  5. doziex says:

    Hiluxes and Toyota landcrusiers in ambush country.(Darfur)

    Dicon and Proforce now have a historic opportunity to provide a solution to the unarmored nightmare that our security forces are facing.

    Please put your best foot and your best ideas forward.

    NAF Alpha jets and Mi-35ps should be able to harass BH quite a bit, with night vision apparatus.

    The Tucano A-29 would be a welcomed addition to the aerial harassment of these insurgents.

    NAF should be taking next day pictures, and doing real battle damage assessments.

    We don’t want to just bomb trees, and dispersed rebels, only to have them regroup and lay waste to another defended town.

    I remember in 1999 as RUF/AFRC rebels approached freetown, and hid in caves in the surrounding forests. Our Alpha jets dropped cluster bombs and rocketed the forest to no avail.

    The rebels eventually descended from those hills and decimated freetown.

    NAF should be working hand in hand with our spec ops units. Like EO worked with NAF jets and EO flown sierra Leonean helicopters.

    Spec ops and air recon teams must spot these rebel bases, then direct air strikes on them.

    Furthermore, our spec ops units should block potential escape routes by laying ambushes.

    Our special forces must become insurgents to BH. They must track, harass and know the whereabouts of BH at all times.
    These tactics would force BH back into the open, or cause them to form larger units for safety. This in turn would provide an inviting target for
    NAF and NA conventional forces.

  6. beegeagle says:

    :-)Oga Doziex

    For any such offensive, there is an INTELLIGENCE officer and and OPERATIONS officer. The OP Officer champions the combat while the INT Officer does the intelligence work and BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT.

    That is almost certainly why this week’s attack on Bita in the Gwoza Hills took place on Sunday night/Monday morning with residents of Maiduguri reporting a flurry of activities and consistent sightings of jets and attack helics heading towards the active frontlines in the mountainous southeast of Borno whereas the battlefield communique only got issued on Thursday.

    But BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS are standard practise during these maneouvres.



    * the MTJF Commander, General Edokpayi said that when he asked his Intelligence Officer to carry out a battle damage assessment, he reported the destruction of 150 houses.”

    end of quote

    The foregoing excerpts were culled from a report written during the more benign pre-emergency rule era, in April 2013.Yes..they always carry out battle damage assessments during such operations.

  7. doziex says:

    HeHe he Oga Beeg, that’s good to know.

    NA should be experts at this business by now. But I am just worrying out loud.

    The last combined offensive was immediately followed by a BH assault on Damaturu.

    With your knowledge of the battle space, how the hell did that happen ?

    • Colonel says:

      It boggles the mind…
      I would have thought that by now NA would have saturated the North east with UAV overflights as well as launched a military satellite dedicated exclusively to North east ops.
      NA generally is vastly improved but they have to up the ante…

    • peccavi says:

      Action-Counter Action:

      The army predictably launched an offensive to clear the highways and the insurgents have predictably shifted. They appear to have moved closer to the borders whether this is simply because security forces there have been denuded for other operations or they have relocated over the Cameroun border is unknown, however it can be conjectured that they appear to have retained their operational cohesion and capability.

      The attack on Damaturu was well planned and executed. They appear to have succeeded in capturing (however briefly) their key targets and destroying others before withdrawing. As the objective of the attack can only have been to capture stores and attrite the security forces men and materiel, it is reasonable to count this as a success for the enemy, despite their casualties.

      That the enemy can still generate the men and leadership to mount such operations despite the pressure it is under demonstrates that there is still a hard core with the will and ability to fight competently.

      Their skill at relocating and launching attacks of alarming barbarity can also be viewed as an operational plus for them. The attacks are effective in that they interdict and isolate communities along the highway, terrorise the civilian population and are of such barbarity that they force the security forces to react. Once the security forces are deployed in clearance operations the enemy launches attacks elsewhere.

      All of this is classic guerrilla behaviour, the Security forces are hard pressed to react any differently but it is clear that other tactics should be explored. The use of fast jet for air support in a COIN op fought in rural areas is not really the most effective use of airpower, attack helicopters or even support helicopters with door gunners would be more effective.

      Thought should be given to aggressive counter guerrilla groups, who will deploy and fight like the insurgents in their chosen areas. The Rhodesians and apartheid South Africans were past masters at this and it is a highly effective tactic.

      Clearance operations will always only just be temporary solutions; to sustain the pressure on the enemy, forces must be deployed to fight the enemy in what they consider their safe areas and these forces must not have the impediment of a long logistic chain, but fight with the same mobility and flexibility of the insurgents. At the same time, ground cleared must be held.

      No small task but the ‘groundhog day’ round of offensive and counter attack has to be changed to be effective

      Marching on your stomach:

      In all of the enemies current operations they have sought to gather supplies, vehicles, food, medicines, fuel, arms, ammunition (and distressingly women as well). This indicates that the leadership is planning for a long campaign and intends to attempt to sustain operations throughout the dry season and beyond.

      However these attacks also indicate something that may or may not be significant. The insurgents have not really displayed this form of rapacious banditry before, this change in ‘resupply chain’ could indicate that their links to their former sources of supplies have been cut, either due to a loss of funds, patronage or increased interdiction.

      This leads to an interesting speculation; whilst operationally the enemy has shown a skill and resilience that indicates they will be a force to be reckoned with for a while, strategically the switch to internal raiding could be an indicator of a change in their fortunes. It is well known that indiscriminate attacks on Muslims alienated insurgents in Iraq from Al Qaeda, likewise in Algeria, the barbarity by the FIS and its off shoots helped an unpopular military regime maintain control.

      Boko Haram has never had much sway beyond the Sahel and appears to have not significantly tapped the huge Gulf Wahhabi money sources in the way Middle Eastern and Central Asian insurgencies have. Most of their funding appears to have come from benefactors, both private and in local government, and then latterly from robberies, kidnappings protection rackets and also from their links to the smuggling and kidnapping networks in the Sahel.

      The links to the Sahel smuggling and kidnap sources would have dried up with the ANSARU split. No longer having access to the major urban centres means that kidnapping and robberies are no longer as easy as before and their members are unlikely or unable to pay subscriptions from the bush and it is highly (and hopefully) unlikely that they are still getting pay offs from politicians.

      Thus even with the vast arms bazaar that is the Sahel, they need money to arm, feed and sustain and if they can’t buy these things they must obtain them by raiding.

      This is a good sign as to the strategic trajectory of the insurgency and also gives a few tactical hints to the security forces as to what targets are likely to attract the enemy, giving ample opportunity for these sites to be hardened or for deliberate ambushes to be laid.

      The enemy has a significant operational capability but the story is not as positive for them as it appears

  8. rka says:

    Excellent write-up oga peccavi. I think the army is learning quickly and adapting. Very soon, they will even better the reputation of the apartheid regime’s troops in guerrilla warfare.

  9. jimmy says:

    i looked at the map that oga camofuflage provided and it showed even on a eyeball sketch how close ( this close) to the borders of Cameroon the a4 bama highway this to me is a big concern .
    i do not want to be the person oga peccavi / rka/doziex remember as kids we were taught the song there is fire on the mountain run run.”
    Nigeria is going to have to decide how close they are going to place sf forces to the border to cut off the escape routes , how close to the airspace of cameroon do the helios go?
    We have someone just short of the gov ( deputy) call for an army base not in borno but as close to this highway as possible then what .

    • peccavi says:

      To closde the borders you either need a chain of forts with a physical barrier, i.e. fence, barbed wire, earth berm or mine fields with partols and artillery.

      Or you can take the fight to the enemy

  10. rka says:

    Oga jimmy, that song made me laugh and it brought back memories.

    I think SFs will have to get as close as necessary and in my book, should cross the border in pursuit of any escaping BH.

    The Army spokesperson did say recently that talks are ongoing with neighbouring countries regarding the BH menace, so it will be left to the politicians to smooth things over.

    The militaries of the countries bordering the NE should really have an established line of communication, so when any operation is fluid, there would be no obstacles in the way that could hamper or derail any operation.

    There is fire on the mountain run run run run.

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